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Abstract 
 
Although widely and convincingly discredited in academic circles, the crude ‘business 
school’ globalisation thesis of a single world market continues to dominate the political 
discourse of globalisation, as does the political ‘logic of no alternative’ that it is seen to 
conjure.  The British Labour Party was an early convert to such a thesis, forging its vote-
maximising economic policy for the 1997 General Election within a discursive context 
bounded by the assumption of globalisation.  After re-election in 2001, the Party continued 
to defend such an assumption.  In this article, we seek to move beyond simple empirical 
rejections of the ‘business school’ globalisation thesis.  Instead, we focus explicitly on the 
discourse of globalisation.  Firstly, we argue that there are three separate, albeit 
reinforcing, articulations of the policy ‘necessities’ associated with global economic 
change – each grounded in a different intellectual tradition.  In other words, globalisation’s 
‘logic of no alternative’ is, in fact, a flexible synthesis of three distinct political-economic 
logics.  Secondly, we scrutinise the narratives of globalisation upon which the Labour 
Party’s governance strategy was publicly predicated, tracing the implications for the 
conduct of economic policy in Britain since 1997.  We show that Labour’s leaders utilised 
precisely such a flexible synthesis of (often mutually incompatible) ideas in constructing 
its political discourse of globalisation.  We conclude that the Party appealed to the image 
of globalisation as a non-negotiable external economic constraint in order to render 
contingent policy choices ‘necessary’ in the interests of electoral rejuvenation. 
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Introduction 
 
Globalisation has increasingly come to be seen as a non-negotiable external economic 
constraint, circumscribing the parameters of both political possibility and political 
choice.*
 
  Although rarely specified in any detail, we take globalisation at minimum to 
imply processes/tendencies that are either genuinely global in scope or genuinely 
trans-national in content.  This conception of globalisation has had a particular 
purchase in Britain, coming to be associated in particular with New Labour.  As we 
seek to demonstrate in this paper, globalisation became an active ingredient of British 
political discourse through a series of high-profile speeches delivered by Labour 
leaders between 1995 and 1997.  Challenged to outline the Party’s economic policy 
prior to the 1997 General Election, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown responded with a 
series of statements that marked a significant departure from previous policy.  This 
strategic reorientation was clearly set within the context of a discourse of 
globalisation.  Moreover, this was a specific discourse of globalisation, which served 
to reinforce the normative political stance which the Party’s leaders had by this time 
come to embrace.  In this way, the distinction between the ‘inevitable’ and the 
‘desirable’ was subtly and, we suggest, strategically blurred in order to increase the 
potency of the message being relayed. 
That message was a simple one.  The political practices and ideologies that served to 
sustain the ‘embedded liberalism’ of the post-war period were no longer feasible nor 
desirable.  The new structural ‘reality’ was one of increasingly disembedded market 
exchange, the conditioning effects of which served merely to affirm the wisdom of the 
Party’s prior ideological shift, its ongoing political reorientation and, indeed, more 
recently, its promotion of itself as a model of a ‘renewed’ social democracy for 
European export (see, for instance, Clift 2001; Lovecy 2001).   
                                                 
* The authors would like to acknowledge funding and support from the ESRC for their research on 
‘Globalisation, European Integration and the European Social Model’ (Grant No.: L213252043).  
Earlier versions of the paper have been presented at conferences in Baltimore, Birmingham, Boston 
(MA), Cambridge (MA) and Keele.  We are extremely grateful to participants, panelists and 
discussants on each occasion for encouraging and perceptive comments.  In particular, we would like to 
thank Sheri Berman, Mark Blyth, David Coates, Philip G. Cerny, Catherine Fieschi, Peter Hall, 
Richard Higgott, Ben Rosamond, Vivien Schmidt, Daniel Wincott and Brigitte Young. 
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In this article, we cast a rather different perspective on this highly significant moment 
in the political economy of British and, potentially, European capitalism.  We 
investigate the way in which a specific set of understandings of globalisation came to 
dominate Labour’s thinking in the years immediately prior to its election, tracing the 
implications for its tenure to date in office.  We argue that a particular political 
discourse of globalisation, rather than the transformation of the international economy 
that such a discourse purported to represent, summoned the ‘inevitable’ political 
effects now inscribed at the heart of Labour’s economic policy.1
 
  Our analysis has a 
dual focus.  We begin by reviewing a number of rather different intellectual routes 
that lead to a conception of globalisation consistent with that espoused by Labour’s 
leaders at this time.  We then assess the narrative of globalisation that has consistently 
underpinned Labour’s economic stance since the mid 1990s, concentrating in 
particular on the ideas around which that narrative was constructed.  We conclude, 
firstly, that Labour’s globalisation discourse was predicated upon a contingent, and 
politically expedient, combination of elements drawn from a range of different 
intellectual traditions; and, secondly, that although contradictory, these traditions 
converged on a common political discourse of globalisation as a non-negotiable 
external economic constraint.  We suggest that whilst for Labour, the invocation of 
globalisation as an exogenous economic constraint served to render the otherwise 
contingent necessary, an examination of the discursive means by which this was 
achieved suggests the need to render that which has come to be seen as necessary 
once again contingent. 
 
                                                 
1 And now re-inscribed at the heart of Labour’s economic policy for the second term.  See Brown 
(2001).  
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Rendering the contingent necessary: three routes to the political ‘logic’ of 
economic compulsion 
 
[T]he explanation [of globalisation] itself has become a political force helping to 
create the institutional realities it purportedly merely describes (Piven 1995: 108). 
 
The suggestion of early globalisation scholars that recent processes of structural 
economic change imply an inexorable process of neo-liberal convergence has now 
been widely discredited (see for instance, Berger and Dore 1996; Boyer and Drache 
1996; Kleinknecht and ter Wengel 1998; Hirst and Thompson 1999).  It may, then, 
seem somewhat indulgent to begin an analysis of globalising tendencies by once again 
revisiting such arguments.  Morbid curiosity aside, there is an obvious reason for so 
doing.  For, in theoretical and, perhaps more importantly, empirical terms, the crude 
‘business school’ globalisation thesis has been exposed for the myth that it 
undoubtedly is.  Yet, in terms of political rhetoric, it continues to exert a powerful 
influence. 
 
The familiarity of such conventional ideas about globalisation stems from the 
frequency with which they are rehearsed by those whose interventions are accepted as 
both legitimate and authoritative.  As Paul Krugman perceptively notes, 
 
Endless rounds of meetings [and] speeches ... occupy much of the time of the 
economic opinion leaders.  Such interlocking social groupings tend at any given time 
to converge on a conventional wisdom, about economics among other things.  People 
believe certain stories because everybody important believes them.  Indeed, when a 
conventional wisdom is at its fullest strength, one’s agreement with that conventional 
wisdom becomes almost a litmus test of one’s suitability to be taken seriously 
(Krugman 1995). 
 
This is nowhere more evident, we contend, than with respect to the conventional 
economic wisdom now associated with the term globalisation.  However, what 
follows should not be understood as a description of a universal condition.  Our 
concern is merely to demonstrate, and to trace the implications of, the significant shift 
in British economic discourse in recent years.  Within the confines of such an 
analysis, it is clear that the image of non-negotiable exogenous economic imperatives 
 5 
was harnessed strategically in order to displace responsibility for otherwise 
unpalatable social and economic reforms, arguably pursued for entirely different ends.  
The justification of reform trajectories (particularly those associated with the scaling-
back of social provision as reflected in the tightening of eligibility criteria) in terms of 
the appeal to external economic imperatives (whether globalisation or European 
Monetary Union) is now an established feature of contemporary European political 
discourse.  Unremarkably perhaps, it is most closely associated with governments of 
the centre-left who find themselves unable, for whatever reasons, to halt an 
established process of welfare retrenchment.  Of course, whilst in aggregate terms 
welfare expenditure (as expressed as a proportion of GDP) has continued to rise in 
most OECD economies, once we control for demand-inflationary pressures (such as 
demographic change, increased unemployment and escalating health care costs) there 
is unambiguous evidence of systematic welfare retrenchment (Hay 2001a).  Such a 
process is likely to proceed at different speeds and to take different forms in different 
countries.  This suggests the value of a comparative analysis (such as Hay and 
Rosamond 2002).  Here, however, we restrict ourselves to a more detailed analysis of 
a particularly early and enthusiastic convert to such a strategy, the British Labour 
Party.   
 
 
Route One: The Business School Globalisation Thesis 
 
The constant repetition of the invariably ‘harsh’ economic realities of new times has 
served to embed a particular reading of post-war British economic history.  That 
history effectively divides the post-war period in two.  Prior to the crisis of the 1970s, 
the relative closure of the advanced industrial economies made possible 
interventionist and expansionary macroeconomic policies and even dirigiste industrial 
strategies.2
                                                 
2 This is, of course, not to suggest that all governments exploited such opportunities at all times; only 
that the prevailing structure of the international economy was seen to facilitate active political control 
of this nature. 
  Thereafter, with the advent of a technologically-induced globalisation 
process, formerly independent economies have been integrated into a single global 
structure.  Within such an environment, anything other than the strictest 
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macroeconomic orthodoxy is no longer feasible.  Any government caught 
contemplating a return to the days of autonomous expansionary policies is inviting 
retribution upon itself at the hands of international financial investors. 
 
Such were the claims of the still highly influential ‘business school’ globalisation 
literature (see, for instance, Reich 1992; Barnet and Cavanagh 1994; Sachs and 
Warner 1995) and the no less significant literature which sought to translate its 
parsimonious generalisations into policy precepts (see, for instance Giddens 1998, 
2000, 2001; Gray 1997, 1998).  Both identified on-going processes of exogenous 
economic change which were rapidly transferring power from ‘the state’ to ‘the 
market’.  In the world so depicted, were governments, by whatever perverse logic, 
still attracted by the prospects of a unilaterally expansionary macroeconomic stance, 
the integration of financial markets would ensure a rapid haemorrhaging of invested 
funds.  The influence of such a view is not difficult to demonstrate, as the 
International Monetary Fund’s report on the ‘opportunities and challenges’ presented 
by globalisation attests well.  “International financial markets ... serve to ‘discipline’ 
governments ... encouraging the adoption of appropriate policies, and ultimately 
rewarding good policies” (IMF 1997: 66).  Currency speculators and hedge fund 
managers may well have replaced Adam Smith’s ‘butcher, brewer and baker’ as the 
agents of the ‘invisible hand’.  But the very fact that the former are far less 
constrained by time and space than their predecessors in this role has served to bestow 
on the ‘invisible hand’ a genuinely global compass.  However, the logic, albeit 
intensified, is essentially preserved.  The obvious casualty in this are those aspects of 
the social contract — such as the welfare state and the commitment to full 
employment — traditionally seen as national in character and design.  Each of these 
must now be trimmed or sacrificed in accordance with the overriding imperative of 
economic competitiveness in an increasingly ‘borderless’ world (Cerny 1990, 1997; 
Gray 1997; Ohmae 1990).  Globalisation, thus understood, announces the global 
diffusion of the strictest macroeconomic orthodoxy; there is simply no alternative. 
 
During the mid 1990s, this view was rapidly established as the public face of the 
globalisation thesis in Britain.  It was reflected in the editorial columns, financial and 
business pages of the tabloid and broadsheet media alike.  Its conclusion — the 
identification of a logic of political ‘necessity’ which undermined the progressive 
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values of a welfare society — was simple; and the business school globalisation thesis 
was perhaps the simplest route to that conclusion — route one.   
 
It was not, however, the only one.  We now move from analytical assumptions which 
originate in the business studies literature to those whose roots are in political 
economy.  Here particularly significant was the ‘modified structural dependence 
thesis’ (Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988; Wickham-Jones 1995). 
 
 
Route Two: The Structural Dependence Thesis 
 
That thesis is a simple one.  It concerns the state’s supposed structural dependence 
upon capital and, in particular, the consequences of heightened capital mobility (in an 
era of globalisation) for this relationship.  As Adam Przeworski and Michael 
Wallerstein note, “politicians seeking re-election must anticipate the impact of their 
policies on the decisions of firms because these decisions affect employment, 
inflation, and the personal income of voters: vote-seeking politicians are dependent on 
owners of capital because voters are” (1988: 12).  The state is thus dependent upon 
capital in the sense that its very continuity as a political entity is reliant upon the 
ability to secure conditions conducive to further investment and capital accumulation.  
In an era of enhanced exit options, capital mobility and potential flight, this places 
considerable constraints on the political latitude of parties vying for state power.  For, 
if we can assume that capital is likely to associate the election of a social democratic 
administration with higher levels of domestic taxation and, in an integrated global 
economy, enjoys near perfect mobility,3
                                                 
3 It should be noted at this stage that, however unrealistic such assumptions, they are essential to the 
model. 
 then the merest hint of the election of a social 
democratic government is likely to be accompanied by a rapid and destabilising 
exodus of capital.  This means that social democratic parties, and even parties such as 
Labour whose social democratic associations have always been somewhat ambiguous, 
must effectively abandon their remaining social democratic credentials to 
accommodate themselves to the perceived interests of capital.  If they fail to accept 
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political demands for low taxation, labour market flexibility (through deregulation),4
 
 
welfare retrenchment and fiscal austerity, the very suggestion of their election is 
likely to precipitate disinvestment, currency speculation and subsequent economic 
crisis.  Once again, within the parameters of such a thesis, there is simply no 
alternative to the strictest macroeconomic orthodoxy within contemporary capitalism.  
Routes one and two converge. 
What is so remarkable about such a thesis is the extent to which it would seem to 
encapsulate Labour’s strategic assessment of the context it projected for itself prior to 
1997 and, indeed, finds itself in today.  Put another way, its behaviour — then and 
now — would appear entirely consistent with that of a utility-maximising social 
democratic party were the structural dependence thesis valid.  That strategy has been 
to distance itself quite explicitly from social democratic policies each and every time 
it has been made aware of the potential mobility of capital.  This, as Mark Wickham-
Jones has made clear in a series of careful and important analyses, can be seen in its 
studious courting, since 1992, first of domestic industry, then the City of London and, 
eventually, international investors from Wall Street to Singapore (1995, 1996, 2000).  
With each realisation that feasible disinvestment strategies were available to capital, 
Labour’s leaders have reoriented party policy towards the interests of the next most 
mobile fraction of capital.  Even the destinations to which its leaders have flown to 
outline the Party’s understanding of the constraints associated with globalisation 
would seem to exhibit a logic consistent with the structural dependence thesis.  The 
details of Labour’s early economic modernisation were directed principally to 
domestic audiences.  Yet, as the constraints of globalisation were acknowledged, the 
target audience was similarly globalised, the venue for the targeting of the audience 
ever further from Britain’s shores.  The message implicit in this needs little 
deciphering.  Whilst the domestic electorate was to be convinced that it had nothing to 
fear from Labour’s economic policy in the early modernisation era, the same 
sentiments were to be addressed to overseas investors as Labour came to internalise 
the discipline implied by the ‘material reality’ of globalisation. 
 
                                                 
4 It is important to emphasise that there are other routes to labour-market flexibility than deregulation.   
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Of course, the fact that Labour can be argued to have acted as if the ‘modified 
structural dependence thesis’ were true is not in any sense confirmation of such a 
thesis (see Hay 1997).  What it does suggest, however, is the need to interrogate the 
assumptions on which the economic logic of structural dependence is premised if we 
are to understand the political logic of no alternative that Labour has increasingly 
come to embrace. 
 
Such logics radiate outwards from a particular conception of the process of 
disinvestment and the socially disembedded exchange relations that such a process 
implies.  In order to comprehend the intellectual roots of this distinctive conception of 
exchange relations, it is necessary to move from political economy to economic 
theory.   
 
 
Route Three: The Need for Counter-Inflationary Credibility 
 
As is now widely acknowledged, the attempt to render mainstream economic theory 
more ‘scientific’ has led to formal abstractions which overlook the social and 
institutional context within which economic relations are necessarily embedded (see, 
for instance, Hodgson 1988; Jessop 1990: O’Neill 1998).  Accordingly, the 
assumption of frictionless markets tends to be accepted in orthodox economic theory 
as both entirely conventional and similarly uncontentious.  What is most important 
about this for current purposes is that such an assumption is the direct and functional 
equivalent of the open economy assumption in the business school globalisation 
literature (Watson 2001).  What in one account is delivered by the assumption of 
perfect factor mobility is, in the other, delivered by the failure to acknowledge 
theoretically the different institutional domains within and between which economic 
transactions occur.   
 
Like that of perfect factor mobility, the assumption of frictionless markets is, at best, 
crude and simplistic — as indeed it must be if it is not to exclude the possibility of the 
parsimonious and predictive model-building that is the raison d’être of the analytical 
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perspectives which adopt it.5
 
  At worst, it is demonstrably false.  However, the true 
significance of the assumption of frictionless markets lies not in its perceived realism 
(most economists would concede that it is false), so much as the perceived legitimacy 
of the policy-making prescriptions which are founded upon it. 
Much of the presumed logic of political constraint that Labour derived from 
globalisation can be traced to the association drawn between heightened capital 
mobility and the increased salience of ‘commitment’, ‘credibility’ and ‘reputation’ 
(although, see Watson 2002).6  Since the mid-1970s, the general thrust of 
macroeconomic theory has concentrated on the presumed inflationary bias which 
results when monetary policy decisions are controlled by elected officials.  Due to 
underlying electoral imperatives, governments are assumed to exhibit ‘time-
inconsistent’ inflation preferences.7
 
  Typically, in the run-up to elections, they will 
trade inflation for lower levels of unemployment.  Such trade-offs, it is argued, are 
inefficient, serving in the long-term only to compound extant inflationary dynamics 
(McKnabb and McKenna 1990).  This diagnosis places great emphasis upon counter-
inflationary credibility and the (largely institutional) means by which this might be 
secured.  Governments that lack such a reputation need not follow a lax inflationary 
policy to trigger destabilising outward flows of capital.  All that is required is for the 
owners of mobile assets to believe that, some time in the future, the government will 
renounce its current counter-inflationary policy, for them to seek to invest their assets 
elsewhere.  Crucial, then, is the ability to construct suitable enforcement mechanisms 
(such an independent central banks mandated to deliver price stability) that will pre-
commit those responsible for monetary policy to a tough counter-inflationary stance 
(see Persson and Tabellini 1990). 
The image of a single global capital market capable of ‘policing’ government 
unemployment preferences in line with credible counter-inflationary commitments 
featured prominently in Labour’s chosen account of exogenous economic constraint.  
                                                 
5 Of course, the business school globalisation thesis shuns precisely the formal modelling which serves 
to render such simplistic assumptions necessary in the first place. 
6 For an excellent review of the literature, see Drazen 2000. 
7 On the seminal articulation of the ‘time-consistency’ dilemma, see Kydland and Prescott (1977); for a 
rather different understanding of the same issue, see Taylor (1983). 
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Globalisation, it argued, ruled out all alternatives to a strictly orthodox economic 
policy (Balls 1998; and, for a commentary Watson 1999a).  If the business school 
globalisation thesis might be seen as route one, the structural dependence thesis route 
two, then this is route three.  The convergence is again clear.  Yet where the three 
accounts do differ is in their specification of the mechanism by which globalisation’s 
political logic of no alternative is imposed, with the emphasis here placed on the need 
to institutionalise rigid inflation targets. 
 
This warrants further unpacking.  In an era of global financial relations, the state’s 
structural dependence on capital is most acute in the financial sector — the arena 
within which an economy’s inflation performance is largely determined.  As Geoffrey 
Garrett notes, “the easier it is for asset holders to move their capital offshore, the 
stronger the incentives for governments to pursue policies that will increase rates of 
return on domestic investment” (1995: 667).  In such a world, credible counter-
inflationary commitments can be assumed to lessen the external constraints on 
government policy in so far as they safeguard returns on domestic investment.  It is 
the establishment and maintenance of anti-inflationary credibility that is arguably the 
core precept of New Labour’s political economy (see also Coates and Hay 2001). 
 
As the above paragraphs suggest, we are confronted with three separate, if mutually 
reinforcing, articulations of the policy ‘necessities’ associated with global economic 
change.  In the remaining sections of this article, we aim to show that Labour invested 
a considerable amount of energy prior to its election in constructing a strategic 
discourse of globalisation capable of securing a lasting place in the public 
consciousness.  The underlying rationale for such a discourse is relatively 
straightforward — to enforce the impression that, like it or not, Labour found itself in 
a potentially hostile policy environment defined, as it was circumscribed, by a set of 
non-negotiable economic constraints.  This was presented as the new ‘structural 
reality’ to whose imperatives all realistic contenders for government had to conform.  
Arguably, in practice, it committed an aspirant centre-left administration to the policy 
set to which it had, by this stage, already committed itself. 
 
In the following section, we challenge the view that this strategic discourse of 
globalisation was merely a description of an underlying ‘structural condition’.  We 
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demonstrate that Labour’s globalisation discourse drew upon a contingent and eclectic 
combination of elements drawn from a range of different — and often 
incommensurate — intellectual traditions.  We find evidence that Labour’s leaders 
used elements of each of the three political-economic logics outlined above in order to 
construct an overarching logic of political ‘necessity’ where the economic ‘realities’ 
themselves did not warrant one.  Three themes will be evident in our survey of 
Labour’s globalisation discourse: 
 
1. Labour appealed to precisely the type of power transfer from ‘state’ to 
‘market’ found in the business school globalisation thesis; 
 
2.  It appealed to the necessary internalisation of the interests of capital 
suggested by structural dependence theorists; and, 
 
3.  It appealed to the specific need for counter-inflationary credibility implied 
by orthodox economic theories of macroeconomic policy-making. 
 
 
New Labour’s ‘New Times’ 
 
The economy is becoming ever more global.  Trade is growing at twice the speed of 
production.  British Airways does its backroom work in Bombay, while a baker in 
South Yorkshire is taking on fifty new staff because his baguettes are selling so well 
in France.  Yesterday’s solutions will not work for tomorrow (Cook 1997). 
 
Much of the literature that attempts to problematise the conventional wisdom on 
globalisation does so by presenting a series of empirical indicators that point to 
processes of structural economic change that fall well short of a genuinely global 
reality.  Such indicators show fairly unequivocally that, however pervasive and 
superficially attractive, claims for globalisation are extremely difficult to substantiate 
in strict empirical terms.  What is more, recent research has demonstrated that, for the 
British and other Northern European economies, external trading relations since the 
1960s reveal a consistent pattern not of globalisation but of de-globalisation.  Thus, 
for instance, the UK’s share of intra-EU to extra-EU export trade has been inverted 
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since 1960: from a ratio of 40:60 to one of 60:40 (Hay 2001b).  However, to engage 
with the empirical arguments and nothing else may well be to divert attention away 
from what is arguably the most salient aspect of the globalisation debate. 
 
In the years immediately preceding the 1997 election, Labour’s leaders clearly both 
spoke and acted as if the most extreme variant of the globalisation hypothesis were an 
accurate description of reality.  This had very real effects.  In this way, the mere 
appeal to the notion of globalisation and the constraints it is seen to imply has served 
to institutionalise many of the consequences the discourse would claim to describe.  
The rhetoric of globalisation was used, we contend, to identify a set of economic 
conditions profoundly antithetical to the post-war social compromise, just as they are 
now seen to entail a revision, dilution and ‘modernisation’ of the ‘European social 
model’.8
 
  The result has been a recasting of the post-war welfare state has been re-cast 
as a ‘competition state’ (Cerny 1990, 1997) and, increasingly, as a model for the 
‘revitalisation’ and ‘modernisation’ of the European social model more generally.  In 
a somewhat paradoxical victory of rhetoric over reality, such a process is taken as 
further evidence of the constraints that globalisation is perceived to impose, thus 
serving to reinforce the political resonance of the initial articulation of globalising 
‘necessities’. 
In this way, the contingent logic of social and economic reform with which New 
Labour has come to be associated is rendered necessary by the appeal to globalisation 
as an exogenous economic constraint (cf. Evans 1997).  This establishes parameters 
limiting the scope of future political decision-making in at least two ways.  First, it 
serves to depoliticise contingent political choices (Burnham 2001).  Second, the path 
dependent effects of such a process may serve, over time, to entrench and 
institutionalise a set of outcomes which were once merely contingent.  Here the neo-
institutionalists are surely right.  Paths, once established, may be difficult to retrace. 
 
                                                 
8 This has been described to us as the clear agenda of the British Government at the Lisbon Special 
European Council of March 2000 (interviews conducted by the authors, 10 Downing Street and the 
Cabinet Office). 
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Such is the frequency with which exogenous processes of economic change have been 
appealed to as a guide for domestic policy that it is possible that the conventional 
wisdom of globalisation has itself become a conditioning influence on policy (Hay, 
Watson and Wincott 1999; Watson 2001).  If true, it is important that one 
acknowledges that ideas about globalisation may have an independent causal impact 
on political outcomes over and above that which can be attributed to recent processes 
of structural economic change per se.  That the Labour Party has chosen to deploy the 
rhetoric of globalisation is undeniable.  It is crucial, then, that we establish on what 
terms it has done so. 
 
The dominant suggestion, rhetorically, is one of a qualitative break with the past.  The 
economic logic of the latest phase of capitalist development is assumed by the Labour 
Party to mark a clear transition with the post-war years.  Moreover, as this logic has 
diffused and penetrated political structures, it is further assumed to have swept away 
the sedimented institutions and dominant conventions of a now bygone era.  Even the 
now familiar addition of the prefix ‘new’ to the party’s name — emphasised in Blair’s 
first statement as Prime Minister, “We have been elected as New Labour; and we will 
govern as New Labour” (Blair 1997b) — is testament to such an assumption.  The 
implicit suggestion is that we have witnessed a paradigm shift in the organisation of 
economic relations, requiring a similarly dramatic shift in the politics of economic 
regulation.  “In a global economy,” Tony Blair argued in a speech to the Singapore 
Business Community, “the old ways won’t do ...  In a modern economy, we [do not] 
need old style dirigisme” (1997a).  Similarly, Gordon Brown argued at the final CBI 
Annual Conference before the 1997 General Election, “we understand that in a global 
market place, traditional national economic policies — corporatism from the old left 
— no longer have any relevance” (1996).  As such, 
 
The key to new Labour economics is the recognition that Britain .. [has] .. to 
compete in an increasingly international market place ...  Today’s Labour Party, new 
Labour, is the political embodiment of the changed world — the new challenges, the 
new policies and the new politics (Blair 1996a). 
 
However else the Labour Party would subsequently present itself in the period 1995-
1997, the first image which it wished to convey was that it should be seen as being 
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qualitatively distinct from its former self.  The novelty of ‘New’ Labour was 
juxtaposed to ‘Old’ Labour, just as the supposedly unique attributes of globalisation 
were emphasised in order to differentiate the logic of the current phase of capitalist 
development from the logic of capitalism per se. 
 
In such a characterisation, causation runs unequivocally from the economic to the 
political.  It is political actors that have had to ‘respond’ to the ‘challenges’ posed by 
the ‘new realities’ of changed economic circumstance.  In this respect, Blair’s 
warning to party supporters with reservations about the pace of Labour’s political 
transformation “to stop living in the past and move with the times” is typical (1996b).  
So too his similarly phrased assessment of Lionel Jospin’s hopes, expressed at the 
Congress of Socialist Parties in Malmo in June 1997, for a more aggressive and 
interventionist European stance on unemployment (1997c).  The ‘new times’ of which 
Labour’s leaders spoke were primarily new economic times; a residual economic 
determinism characterising the Party’s accounts of its own ‘modernisation’. 
 
It was through this implicitly determinist conception of the relationship between the 
economic and political spheres that much of the Party’s new rhetoric on ‘the market’ 
was activated.  The new structure of the international economy was seen to constrain, 
in particular, those parties most traditionally associated with the ethos of active 
economic government.9
                                                 
9 Activism is, of course, by no means wholly absent from New Labour’s discursive repertoire.  
However, the much vaunted ‘activation’ of labour-market and social policy is in fact highly 
conditional.  With respect to such arenas of intervention, the government is active only in translating 
perceived economic necessities into social imperatives.  New Labour’s activism is thus restricted to the 
active subordination of social policy to perceived economic exigencies (see also Levitas 1998; Lister 
2002).   
  Market-conforming policies were held increasingly to be 
‘enforced’ by external economic pressures.  In the ‘business school’ account of 
globalisation this logic is forcibly asserted —global economic processes sound the 
death knell for social democracy (Gray 1997).  However, mindful perhaps of (further) 
alienating core constituencies, Labour’s expression of an ultimately similar prognosis 
was more moderate in tone.  “In the complex and increasingly integrated world 
economy,” Gordon Brown told the Party’s influential Finance and Industry Group, 
“we need a clear appreciation of the role — and the limits — of government” (1995, 
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emphasis added).  Interestingly, this conception of the essential fallibility of 
government was introduced as an immediate precursor to the section of the speech 
headed, “No return to past failures”.  In contrast to the ‘failed’ world of ‘Old’ Labour, 
the ‘future’ world of ‘New’ Labour was one in which there would be no place for an 
over-active government.  The rhetorical authority conveyed by this dualistic 
counterposing of old and new, failure and future, served to legitimate what was to 
become something of a New Labour mantra with respect to macroeconomic policy — 
good government is minimal government.   
 
The origins of such a view clearly lie in the business school globalisation literature.  
The world has experienced a systematic transfer of political power from states to 
markets; the space for alternatives to market-conforming agendas is, consequently, 
severely circumscribed.  This theme has been tirelessly reiterated since the mid 1990s.  
Labour’s globalisation rhetoric was predicated upon the assumption that exogenous 
economic forces ensured that “choices are constrained” in line with a strict 
macroeconomic orthodoxy.  Above all else, Party officials saw globalisation as the 
end for the familiar “panaceas” of the ‘old’ left (Blair 1996a). 
 
This assumption was deployed, with some degree of success, to disorient the natural 
political grammar associating market-conforming policies with the ‘right’, market-
adjusting reforms with the ‘left’.  Blair, in particular, rejected the suggestion of an 
ideological betrayal.   Market advocacy, he argued, was not so much an ideological 
choice as a technical necessity in an era of heightened capital mobility.  A concerted 
effort was made to ensure that ‘the market’ might come to be identified as a legitimate 
symbol of the Party’s political aspirations.  It is within the context of this attempt to 
appropriate the traditional political economy of the British right (Thompson 1990) 
that we should understand Blair’s insistence that, in the future, it will be common for 
“solutions adopted by left and right [to] overlap” (1996a).  Blair’s most direct 
enunciation of this theme came in a speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, six months 
after entering Downing Street.  He chose this occasion to set out his definition of 
‘New’ Labour, arguing in distinctly Giddensian terms for: 
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a politics no longer scarred by the irrelevant ideological battles of much of the 
twentieth century… [M]ost of the left/right tags today are nothing but obstacles to 
good thinking (1997d). 
 
Moreover, such was the rhetorical significance of globalisation that even this 
statement of basic political philosophy was set within the context of the technical 
requirements summoned by exogenous economic change.  The internalisation of such 
imperatives and the consequent downsizing of Labour’s aspirations for government 
marked a re-positioning in relation to ‘the market’ more pronounced than at any time 
during the modernisation process (Gamble 1996).  Its early re-positioning under 
Kinnock and Smith had shifted the Party from a stance of outright hostility towards 
market principles to one of general scepticism towards market outcomes.  From there, 
it progressed first to grudging acceptance, and finally to open embrace.  Arguably, it 
is this that has made possible the exploration of the public/private boundary within the 
public sector which seems set to characterise Labour’s second term.   
 
“Modern government has a strategic role,” the Labour Party declared in its 1992 
election manifesto, “not to replace the market but to ensure the market works 
properly” (1992: 11).  This is a theme that key Party strategists picked up on and 
refined in the years following the 1992 electoral defeat.  By 1996, Blair was willing to 
endorse only the first element of this statement.  Whilst maintaining the view that “the 
modern function of government is not to second-guess the market” (1996a), the 
previous qualification that market-correcting interventions would still be sanctioned 
was now conspicuous only by its absence. 
 
By 1997, the move away from discretionary policy-making, a move that has 
dominated the last twenty-five years of orthodox economic theory and Labour 
thinking alike, was confirmed.  Labour now came to endorse a very different theory.  
This suggested that the limit of acceptable government intervention was the 
implementation of a rules-based policy.10
                                                 
10 On the ‘rules versus discretion’ debate, see Drazen (2000).  For a rather more political reading of 
that debate, see Burnham (1999). 
  Within this emergent paradigm, the limits 
of a rational administration’s economic activism are in supplying the market with 
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information about its intentions.  This it does by publicising a series of medium-term 
macroeconomic targets. 
 
One of the most notable aspects of Labour’s new economic policy was the degree to 
which it conformed to the dictates of orthodox macroeconomic theory.  In its desire to 
foster market expectations that it had created, in Gordon Brown’s words, “a credible 
framework for monetary discipline” (1995), Labour elevated the perceived need to 
“set an explicit target for low inflation” to the “first goal of policy” (Blair 1996a).  
The suppression of inflationary tendencies was in turn assumed to entail a 
commitment to “lay down rules” which might establish a regime “fierce in controlling 
public spending” (Brown 1996).  To this end, Brown published explicit spending 
targets, first as Shadow Chancellor and subsequently from the Treasury, in order that 
“nobody should doubt [his] iron resolve for stability and fiscal prudence” (press 
release, 28 April 1997).  The theme was forcefully reiterated in Brown’s Mansion 
House speech immediately following the party’s 2001 electoral triumph (2001).   
 
As this suggests, the rhetoric of globalisation has consistently been deployed to 
explain the systemic shift in macroeconomic focus from employment-promoting to 
anti-inflationary preferences.  As Blair suggested, in the new economic environment 
(although not necessarily before), “low inflation is not simply a goal in itself, it is the 
essential prerequisite both of ensuring that business can invest and that supply-side 
measures can work to raise the capacity of the economy to grow” (1995).  Those 
operating within global foreign exchange markets are now assumed to be able to exert 
a considerable influence over the policy autonomy of governments who do not appear 
to share their concerns for price stability.  The image cultivated by Labour’s Treasury 
team in opposition — and later in government — was one of “more choice and 
freedom than ever before” for investors to move their financial assets where, when 
and how they pleased.  In Brown’s words, “day to day flows of capital are greater and 
faster than ever before”.  Consequently, “today, the judgement of the markets – 
whether to punish or to reward government policies – is as swift as it is powerful” 
(cited in Shaw 1997). 
 
This rapprochement with ‘the market’ would appear to be a reaction, specifically, to 
assumptions about global market relations.  Perceptions of the necessity of market-
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conforming policies consistent with the ‘business school’ globalisation thesis were 
themselves presented as a logical consequence of the need to adopt counter-
inflationary policies consistent with the conclusions of orthodox macroeconomic 
theory. 
 
Viewed in this way, any outward diffidence towards ‘the market’ — or, more 
accurately, towards the concerns for price stability of those operating within foreign 
exchange markets — is thought to force financial activity offshore.  For assets to be 
retained within domestic markets any future Labour Government would have to 
“convince the markets” of its anti-inflationary credibility (Blair 1997b).  A dual 
strategy was consequently adopted.  On entering office, Blair’s Government acted 
tough by reconfiguring the institutional environment in which British monetary policy 
was determined, in the hope of embedding a strict institutional ‘logic’ of counter-
inflationary credibility.  Yet prior to that decision, and whilst still in opposition, 
Labour talked tough, sending the ‘correct’ counter-inflationary signals to those 
guardians of national liquidity, the international financial markets.  Here the clear 
supposition was that speculative flows of short-term financial assets are triggered 
increasingly by expectations of future government policy, rather than by policy itself 
(Watson 1999b).  To a significant extent, then, the ‘demands’ of a global era have 
been interpreted to imply that the execution of a ‘successful’ macroeconomic policy 
relies upon the execution of a ‘successful’ (i.e., credible) discursive strategy.  
Arguably macroeconomic policy here enters the realm of symbolic politics. 
 
Of course, one way in which governments can increase the credibility of their 
economic discourse is to provide an institutional context which selects for — or, 
better still, guarantees — the policy outcomes embedded within that discourse.  This 
the Blair Government achieved within a week of taking office by delegating 
operational control for the setting of interest rates to the Bank of England.  By placing 
the key instrument of contemporary monetary policy beyond the direct control of the 
Treasury, Labour effectively externalised responsibility for counter-inflationary 
credibility (Balls 1998; Burnham 2001; Coates and Hay 2001).  Such a deliberate 
attempt to depoliticise domestic monetary policy relations was guided by the 
assumption that “the City ... believes that the Bank will be a lot less tolerant about 
inflation than any government could be” (Daily Telegraph, 7 May 1997).  This 
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impression was almost immediately confirmed.  For, the day after the reforms were 
announced, the British press reported genuine delight within the City of London at the 
Government’s decision.  Two comments from that day’s Financial Times are 
sufficient to illustrate this point.  John Sheppard, then chief economist at the ill-fated 
Japanese securities house, Yamaichi International, observed that “the government’s 
credibility has been vastly improved by this bold step”.  Similarly, Andrew Roberts, 
bond analyst at the Swiss Bank, UBS, remarked, “it is unbelievable to gain so much 
financial market credibility with such a simple move” (Financial Times, 7 May 1997). 
 
Although the Government must have been tempted to emphasise the enhanced 
credibility that it had immediately generated for itself, its chosen rationalisation for 
this radical and unpredicted move (for which, arguably, it lacked a mandate) was 
rather different.  Operational independence for the Bank of England was, it insisted, a 
necessary condition of competitiveness within the global economy.11
 
  A clear 
distinction can thus be drawn between the way in which Labour presented the 
constraints of the international economic environment before it chose to grant 
operational independence to the Bank of England, and the way in which it rationalised 
that decision after the fact.  The prior rhetorical stance suggests that the decision to 
cede interest rate control was driven by concerns to appear hyper-sensitive to 
inflationary pressures, in much the way implied by orthodox economic theories of 
macroeconomic policy-making.  By contrast, the stance it later came to adopt was 
more expressive of concerns for internalising the interests of domestic capital — a 
stance more consistent with the structural dependence thesis. 
National competitiveness has increasingly become a central preoccupation of 
governance strategies throughout the world (see Krugman 1994).  What is clear from 
the British case is the way in which Labour appropriated such concerns as a means of 
providing its globalisation discourse with a popular political resonance.  Had it 
constructed the challenges of globalisation merely in terms of the need to placate 
international financial markets, it left itself open to the charge that it had placed the 
                                                 
11 Here see, especially, Gordon Brown’s letter to the Governor of the Bank of England, Eddie George, 
explaining the decision to reconfigure the institutional setting for interest rate policy.  A full 
transcription appears in Financial Times, 07 May.  
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interests of faceless overseas investors above those of British firms and, by extension, 
ordinary British people.  By translating such imperatives into the language of 
competitiveness it could claim to answer to a more inclusive conception of the 
national interest and, in so doing, to offer a genuinely non-partisan economic policy. 
 
Yet, in satisfying the need for domestic legitimation, Labour injected a number of 
contradictions into its economic message.  On the one hand, it wished to be seen to 
advocate an avowedly non-interventionist economic policy, so that it would be 
apparent that it was “work[ing] with the grain of global change” to “embrace the 
global market” (Blair 1997b).  At the same time, the task of promoting national 
competitiveness was clearly impossible in the absence of (market-correcting) political 
interventions.  Loud and gratuitous proclamations of the essential limits of 
government were therefore translated rather unevenly into practice.  There is, of 
course, no need for resonant discursive constructions to be internally coherent.  Yet, 
the fact that Labour has so rarely been challenged to justify its globalisation discourse 
has allowed such contradictions to pass largely unnoticed. 
 
Labour’s stance on the issue of intervention has been to limit what might be seen as 
market-correcting measures to those “aimed at increasing the competitiveness of 
British companies in increasingly competitive markets” (Labour Industry Forum 
1996: 2; see also Coates and Hay 2001).  Here the clumsy repetition of the word 
‘competitive’ serves as an index of the perceived significance of the concept.  In this 
respect, there was little difference between Labour’s aims and those of the previous 
Conservative Government — to generate “the right climate ... to help business to help 
itself” (DTI 1996: 1).  The basis of this perhaps unlikely consensus was the desire to 
foster an economic climate that might be looked upon favourably by the managers of 
national and international capital alike.  The relatively uncontested nature of national 
competitiveness strategies appeared to offer superficial evidence that investors were 
now able, at will, to confirm the state’s structural dependence on capital through 
threats of disinvestment. 
 
In order to stave off such threats, Labour has attempted to forward a competitiveness 
strategy that would translate macroeconomic precepts into microeconomic 
imperatives.  It has consistently argued that its commitment to the interests of British 
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capital is demonstrated at the macroeconomic level by its “determination to create a 
modern monetary framework” capable of “command[ing] confidence and credibility” 
(Brown, interview, Financial Times, 7 May 1997).  Such a “stable low inflation 
environment” was presented as the “platform ... from which we can build our 
industrial strength” (1995).  Yet it is through strategic microeconomic interventions 
that such ‘industrial strength’ is expected to emerge.  In practice this has meant that 
— ‘limits of government’ rhetoric notwithstanding — it has imposed itself forcibly on 
the microeconomics of the labour market. 
 
Labour’s practice stands in some tension to the exaggerated claims of state 
obsolescence to be found in the ‘business school’ globalisation thesis.  The state has 
not so much withered away due to external forces.  Rather, its form and function have 
been subjected to wholesale redefinition through internal pressure (Jessop 1994; 
Watson 1999a).  Labour’s overall economic discourse has undergone a significant 
shift that reflects prior processes of internal state reform.  Where once it had 
advocated an active state at the macroeconomic level, by 1997 it was content to make 
the case for a state whose economic competencies were restricted to the ability to 
intervene in line with perceived microeconomic imperatives.  This represents a shift 
in both the form and content of state interventions from classical stabilisation policy 
(on the economics of which, see Stevenson, Muscatelli and Gregory 1988) to 
competitiveness enhancing strategies (on the politics of which, see Cerny 1997). 
 
In this respect, Labour contested both the 1997 and 2001 General Elections with a 
conception of industrial policy narrower than at any time in the Party’s history.  
Indeed, its industrial policy extended little further than a simple re-statement of its 
labour market policy.  In the words of the ‘Road to the Manifesto’ documents, under a 
New Labour government: 
 
What there will be is a new deal for people at work ...  [The] world is changing ...  
Companies need both the capability and the flexibility to succeed in this new world 
...  We must avoid rigidity in labour market regulation and promote the flexibility we 
require (Labour Party 1996: 1). 
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Similarly, when entering the debate on global economics from his position at the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Robin Cook did so on almost identical terms:  
 
Britain is a global player ...  Companies must be able to adapt to a fast-changing 
market.  Otherwise, they stop being competitive and cannot create jobs ...  We must 
guarantee [that government legislation does not] over-burden business and destroy 
jobs (Cook 1997). 
 
The deployment of a globalisation rhetoric consistent with the claims of structural 
dependence theorists therefore shifts the focus from a universal experience of 
globalising tendencies (what can be done now that no-one has the option to use 
discretionary macroeconomic policies?) to a much more particular experience (what 
can ‘we’ do to ensure that ‘our’ businesses are more competitive than their overseas 
rivals?).  The discourse of globalisation constructed in the years immediately 
preceding the 1997 election is a flexible synthesis of quite distinct elements.  The 
moral force with which Labour’s leaders were able to articulate that discourse, and the 
political gains they were able to make by claiming for the Party the authoritative voice 
in negotiating the constraints of globalisation, owed much to the way that these very 
different elements were called upon to advance a single political programme of 
reform. 
 
In the final concluding section, we consider Labour’s success in harnessing the image 
of global economic ‘forces’ to mobilise widespread support for the political project to 
which it was already committed.  The essence of Labour’s success should be 
understood, as the title of this article implies, in terms of the Party’s ability to render 
the contingent politics of orthodox macroeconomic management increasingly 
‘necessary’ through appeal to the supposedly pervasive influence of external 
economic dynamics. 
 
 
 
Rendering the ‘Necessary’ Contingent Once Again: Contesting the Political 
Logic of No Alternative 
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[T]he truth effects of discourses of economic globalisation are somewhat independent of 
the veracity of the analysis (Rose 1996: 354). 
 
The popular and academic receptions of the discourse of globalisation on which 
Labour has drawn could not be more different.  That this is so reflects the degree of 
critical scrutiny to which they have been exposed.  The image of global economic 
change to which the Party appealed tended to be accepted uncritically by the British 
media.  The academic response, however, has been altogether different.  At exactly 
the time that Labour’s leaders were seeking to popularise a ‘strong’ version of the 
globalisation thesis, such a thesis was exposed to intense and, we would suggest, 
devastating empirical critique (see, for instance, Berger and Dore 1996; Boyer and 
Drache 1996; Hirst and Thompson 1999).  As the debate about globalisation 
consequently polarised around the two discordant camps of ‘radicals’ and ‘sceptics’ 
(on which, see Giddens 1999), little attention was paid to Labour’s distinctive, 
eclectic and contradictory globalisation discourse.  Such an analysis is long overdue. 
 
New Labour’s globalisation discourse, as we have sought to demonstrate, is complex, 
drawing on three distinct elements.  Yet each of these reinforces a common political 
conclusion.  Whilst, then, the Party’s globalisation discourse was a flexible synthesis 
of ideas drawn from different — and often mutually incompatible — intellectual 
traditions, the separate elements of that discourse were forged together in a single 
political message. 
 
1. By accepting the ‘business school’ globalisation thesis, Labour’s leaders 
appropriated the image of a structurally weakened state necessarily ceding 
economic power to market imperatives.  For twenty years, ‘market 
exchange’ had been synonymous with middle-class interests, especially for 
those elements of the middle-classes employed within the private sector.  
Labour now invoked the imperatives of globalisation to suggest that no 
government could resist an institutionalised system of ‘market exchange’.  
By reiterating the theme of a structurally weakened state, Labour was able 
to relay a (convenient) political message directly to core marginals of 
‘middle England’.  In adopting the language of the ‘business school’ 
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thesis, it was tacitly admitting that it was now impossible to disentangle 
middle-class interests from the state policy-making agenda. 
 
2. By accepting the theory of the state’s structural dependence on capital, 
Labour’s leaders highlighted the dangers that were posed by a system of 
enhanced exit options for any government that failed to convince the 
business lobby that it had internalised the preferences of capital.  It 
presented globalisation as a regime of heightened capital mobility.  In such 
an environment, businesses dissatisfied with government policy would re-
locate their production activities elsewhere, taking valuable sources of 
investment and jobs with them as they went.  This allowed Labour to 
address the specific concerns of its new target constituencies with its 
reputation as a party of ‘tax-and-spend’.  Again by reiterating (in the face 
of strong empirical evidence to the contrary) a belief that, in a world of 
unbounded locational choice, businesses would refuse to invest in highly-
taxed environments, Labour was able to reduce the tax agenda to a purely 
technical issue of ‘competent’ economic management in an era of 
globalisation. 
 
3. By accepting orthodox theories of macroeconomic policy-making, 
Labour’s leaders were able to withstand the charge that its depoliticisation 
of the economic agenda was merely an electoral ruse which would be 
reversed as soon as the Party took office.  Investors operating within 
international financial markets, they claimed, would only tolerate policy-
makers with the reputation for counter-inflationary ‘credibility’.  
Moreover, such a reputation would only be granted to those who tied their 
own hands in relation to future macroeconomic policy.  By stating that a 
future Labour Government would pre-commit its policies into the long-
term — and by institutionalising that pre-commitment in office — it was 
able to disarm anxieties that pre-election commitments would be 
sacrificed, at some point in the future, on the altar of a more progressive 
policy stance.  The articulation of orthodox economic theories of 
macroeconomic policy-making therefore became a means of providing a 
market-friendly ‘automatic pilot’ for future policy. 
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Through its success in combining these three narratives of external economic 
compulsion into a single political message, Labour was able to render its own pre-
election commitments ‘credible’.  The language of ‘necessity’ which it invoked was a 
crucial element in such a process. 
 
Yet it is only in one very limited sense that there is a necessitarian logic to New 
Labour’s political economy.  Having identified a new set of target constituencies with 
a (supposedly) natural aversion to more traditional economic policies, the need to 
construct a more orthodox policy stance became a condition of electoral rejuvenation.  
Having identified globalisation as an external constraint capable of enforcing 
convergence around orthodox policy norms, it was important that it was able to 
ascribe a logic of ‘necessity’ to globalisation.  Such a necessitarian logic is then 
contingent only on the psephologically-conservative prior decision in 1997 and, 
indeed, 2001, to base the Party’s electoral strategy on the appeal to the median voter 
in ‘middle-England’ marginals.  In sum, then, we suggest, it was Labour’s perceived 
electoral expediency which drove it to adopt a necessitarian discourse of globalisation 
rather than the converse. 
 
We thus depart from the vast majority of the literature (both orthodox and heterodox), 
which accepts at face value New Labour’s assessment that the external reality of 
globalisation shaped its 1997 General Election strategy and its conduct to date in 
office.  Rather, we argue that it was the choice of electoral strategy which shaped the 
distinctive features of Labour’s globalisation discourse.  If we are to accept that the 
choice of any electoral strategy is a contingent and political decision, then we must 
conclude that the choice of one amongst many possible discourses of globalisation is 
also contingent and political.  That the contingent politics of labour market and 
welfare reform has seemingly been rendered necessary is a triumph, not of the non-
negotiable character of globalisation, but of political rhetoric and electoral expediency 
over economic reality.   
 
  
 27 
Bibliography 
 
Balls, E. (1998) ‘Open Macroeconomics in an Open Economy: Scottish Economic Society/Royal Bank 
of Scotland Annual Lecture, 1997’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 45 (2), 113-32. 
Barnet, R. and J. Cavanagh, J. (1994) Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations. 
New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Berger, S. and Dore, R. (eds.) (1996) National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Blair, T. (1995) Mais Lecture, London, 22 May. 
––––––. (1996a) Speech to the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V. Annual Conference, Bonn, 
18 June. 
––––––. (1996b) Interview, Sunday Times, 1 September. 
––––––. (1997a) Speech to Labour Party workers, Royal Festival Hall, London, 2 May. 
––––––. (1997b) Speech to the Singapore Business Community, Singapore, 8 January. 
––––––. (1997c) Speech to the Congress of Socialist Parties, Malmö, 6 June. 
––––––. (1997d) Speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, Guildhall, London, 10 November. 
Boyer, R. and Drache, D. (eds.) (1996) States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalisation. London: 
Routledge. 
Brown, G. (1995) Speech to the Labour Party Finance and Industry Group, 17 May.  
––––––. (1996) Speech to the Confederation of British Industry Annual Conference, Harrogate, 11 
November. 
––––––. (2001) Speech at the Mansion House, London, 20 June. 
Burnham, P. (1999) ‘The Politics of Economic Management in the 1990s’, New Political Economy 4 
(1), 37-54. 
––––––. (2001) ‘New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation’, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, 3 (2), 127-49. 
Cerny, P. G. (1990) The Changing Architecture of Politics. London: Sage. 
––––––. (1997) ‘Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalisation’, 
Government and Opposition, 32, 251-74. 
Clift, B. (2001) ‘New Labour’s Third Way and European Social Democracy’, in S. Ludlam and M. J. 
Smith (eds.) New Labour in Government. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Coates, D. and Hay, C. (2001) ‘The Internal and External Face of New Labour’s Political Economy’, 
Government and Opposition, 36, forthcoming. 
Cook, R. (1997) Speech to the Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, 3 November. 
Department of Trade and Industry (1996) Competitiveness: Forging Ahead, Cm 2867. London: HMSO. 
Drazen, A. (2000) Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 
Evans, P. (1997) ‘The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalisation’, World 
Politic, 50 (1), 62-87. 
 28 
Gamble, A. ‘The Legacy of Thatcherism’, in M. Perryman (ed.) The Blair Agenda. London: Lawrence 
and Wishart. 
Garrett, G. (1995) ‘Capital Mobility, Trade and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy’, 
International Organization, 49 (4), 657-87. 
Giddens, A. (1998) The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity. 
––––––. (1999) Runaway World. London: Profile Books. 
––––––. (2000) The Third Way and its Critics. Cambridge: Polity. 
––––––. (ed.) (2001) The Global Third Way Debate. Cambridge: Polity. 
Gray, J. (1997) ‘After Social Democracy: Politics, Capitalism and the Common Life’, in Endgames. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
––––––. (1998) False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism. London: Granta. 
Hay, C. (1997) ‘Anticipating Accommodations, Accommodating Anticipations: The Appeasement of 
Capital in the Modernisation of the British Labour Party, 1987-1992’, Politics and Society, 25, 
234-56. 
––––––. (1999) The Political Economy of New Labour: Labouring Under False Pretences? 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
––––––. (2001a) ‘Globalisation, Economic Change and the Welfare State: The Vexatious Inquisition of 
Taxation?’, in R. Sykes, B. Palier and P. M. Prior (eds.) Globalisation and European Welfare 
States: Challenges and Change. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
––––––. (2001b) ‘Globalisation, Competitiveness and the Future of the Welfare State in Europe’, Paper 
presented at the conference of the European Community Studies Association, Madison, 
Wisconsin. 
Hay, C. and Rosamond, B. (2002) ‘Globalisation, European Integration and the Discursive 
Construction of Economic Imperatives’, Journal of European Public Policy, forthcoming. 
Hay, C., Watson. M., and Wincott, D. (1999) Globalisation, European Integration and the Persistence 
of European Social Models, ESRC One Europe or Several?’ Working Papers, no. 3/99. 
Hodgson, G. (1988) Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
International Monetary Fund (1997) Globalisation: Opportunities and Challenges, Special Issue of 
World Economic Outlook. New York: IMF. 
Jessop, B. (1990) State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
––––––. (1994) ‘Changing Forms and Functions of the State in an Era of Globalisation and 
Regionalisation’ in R. Delorme and K. Dopfer (eds) The Political Economy of Diversity: 
Evolutionary Perspectives on Economic Order and Disorder. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Kleinknecht, A.and ter Wengel, J. (1998) ‘The Myth of Economic Globalisation’, Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, 22 (4), 637-47 
Krugman, P. (1994) ‘Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession?’, Foreign Affairs, March/April, 28-44. 
––––––. (1995) ‘Dutch Tulips and Emerging Markets’, Foreign Affairs, 74, 28-44. 
Kydland, F. and Prescott, E. (1977) ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal 
Plans’, Journal of Political Economy, 85 (3), 473-90. 
 29 
Labour Industry Forum (1996) Winning for Britain. London: Labour Party. 
Labour Party (1992) It’s Time to Get Britain Working Again: 1992 General Election Manifesto. 
London: Labour Party. 
––––––. (1996) Building Prosperity – Flexibility  Efficiency and Fairness at Work, Road to the 
Manifesto. London: Labour Party. 
Levitas, R. (1998) The Inclusive Society? Social Exclusion and New Labour. Basingstoke: Macmillan.  
Lister, R. (2002) ‘Towards a New Welfare Settlement?’, in C. Hay (ed.) British Politics Today. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
Lovecy, J. (2001) ‘New Labour and the ‘Left that is Left’ in Western Europe’, in D. Coates and P. 
Lawler (eds.) New Labour in Power. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
McNabb, R. and McKenna, C. (1990) Inflation in Modern Economies. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Ohmae, K. (1990) The Borderless World. London: Collins. 
O’Neill, J. (1998) The Market: Ethics, Knowledge and Politics. London: Routledge. 
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1990) Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics. London: 
Harwood Academic Publishers. 
Piven, F. P. (1995) ‘Is It Global Economics or Neo-Laissez Faire?’, New Left Review 213, 107-14. 
Przeworski, A. and Wallerstein, M. (1988) ‘Structural Dependence of the State on Capital’, American 
Political Science Review, 82 (2), 11-30. 
Reich, R. (1992) The Work of Nations. New York:Vintage Books. 
Rose, N. (1996) ‘The Death of the Social? Re-Figuring the Territory of Government’, Economy and 
Societ, 25, (3), 327-56. 
Sachs, J. and Warner, A. (1995) ‘Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration’, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1, 1-118. 
Shaw, E. (1997) ‘The Trajectory of New Labour: Some Preliminary Thoughts’, paper presented at the 
American Political Science Association, Washington, August 28-31. 
Stevenson, A., Muscatelli, V. and Gregory, M. (1988) Macroeconomic Theory and Stabilisation 
Policy. London: Philip Allan. 
Taylor, J. (1983) ‘Comment’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, (1), 123-5. 
Thompson, G. (1990) The Political Economy of the New Right. London: Pinter. 
Watson, M. (1999a) ‘Globalisation and the Development of the British Political Economy’, in David 
Marsh et al, Postwar British Politics in Perspective. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
––––––. (1999b) ‘Rethinking Capital Mobility, Reregulating Financial Markets’, New Political 
Economy, 3 (3), 407-26. 
––––––. (2001) ‘International Capital Mobility in an Era of Globalisation: Adding a Political 
Dimension to the “Feldstein-Horrioka Puzzle”’, Politics, 21 (2), 81-92. 
––––––. (2002) ‘The Institutional Paradoxes of Monetary Orthodoxy: Reflections on the Political 
Economy of Central Bank Independence’, Review of International Political Economy, 9 (1), 
183-96. 
 30 
Wickham-Jones, M. (1995) ‘Anticipating Social Democracy, Pre-empting Anticipations: Economic 
Policy-Making in the British Labour Party, 1987-1992’, Politics and Society, 23 (4), 465-94. 
––––––. (1996) Economic Strategy and the Labour Party: Politics and Policy-Making, 1970-83. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
––––––. (2000) ‘New Labour and the Global Economy: Partisan Politics and the Social Democratic 
Model’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2 (1), 1-25. 
 
 
